Universal Banking and Financial Stability by Garten, Helen A.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 19
Issue 1
SYMPOSIUM:
Global Trends Toward Universal Banking:
Comparative Bank Regulation/Meeting The
Regulatory Challenge
Article 7
9-1-1993
Universal Banking and Financial Stability
Helen A. Garten
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Helen A. Garten, Universal Banking and Financial Stability, 19 Brook. J. Int'l L. 159 (1993).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol19/iss1/7
UNIVERSAL BANKING AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY
Helen A. Garten*
Is universal banking a solution to the problem of bank fail-
ure? Many critics of the United States' fragmented banking
structure believe so. The United States Treasury Department
based its recommendation to allow banks to affiliate with finan-
cial and commercial firms on the assumption that "the blending
,of banking, finance and commerce will create a stronger, more
diversified financial system."1 Bank regulators in France, Ger-
many and Italy cite universal banking as an explanation of their
nations' low rates of bank failure compared with that of the
United States.2
As the cost of bank failure continues to mount, this argu-
ment for universal banking becomes especially compelling. If
bank failure rates are an appropriate yardstick of financial sta-
bility, the European-style universal banking model has proved
to be much more stable than our own unique fragmented finan-
cial structure.3
Nevertheless, two questions remain unanswered. First, why
are universal banks apparently less prone to failure than frag-
mented banks? Second, if universal banking becomes the domi-
* Professor of Law, Rutgers-Newark.
1. MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYsTEm: U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR SAFER, MORE CoMparrvE BANKS 55 (1991) [hereinafter TREASURY
RECOMMENDATIONS].
2. See General Accounting Office, Deposit Insurance: Overview of Six Foreign Sys-
tems, GAOINSIAD-91-104 31 (1991) [hereinafter GAO Study] ("In the opinion of their
national regulators, French, German and Italian banks that operate as universal banks
are able to lessen their risk of exposure through their ability to offer diversified
services.").
3. Germany, France and Italy are usually.viewed as the nations with the purest uni-
versal banking systems. Japan retains legal barriers between commercial and investment
banking (which date from the post-war occupation and were based on our own Glass-
Steagall Act), but, in practice, the network of financial relationships within the bank-
centered corporate groups known as keiretsu has produced a banking system that is
closer to the universal banking model than to the U.S. model. Britain has been moving
toward universal banking, although commercial and investment banking historically have
been dominated by separate entities; in fact, the British system is generally thought to
be the model for our fragmented regulatory structure. See Edwin J. Perkins, The Di-
vorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 485-86
(1971). As will be shown, however, U.S. financial markets and financial market regulation
have been shaped by uniquely American experiences and differ from both their British
and continental European counterparts.
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nant financial structure in the United States, will United States
banks enjoy the same stability as their European rivals?
The answers to these questions may be somewhat surpris-
ing. A close analysis of imiversal banking systems reveals that
their source of strength is not the combination of different fi-
nancial services under one roof, but a peculiar capital.market
structure that has necessitated the forging of defensive long-
term bank-client relationships. Moreover, other factors, includ-
ing oligopolistic industry structures and government policy, have
contributed more to keeping banks healthy than has the mix of
bank powers. This suggests that European-style universal bank-
ing (or its Japanese variation) is indigenous. Attempts to trans-
plant it to the United States will produce an entirely different
hybrid.
This does not mean that the United States should not ex-
pand the legal powers of its banks. It simply means that at-
tempts to replicate the universal banking model, particularly in
the hope of finding a solution to current banking problems, are
likely to fail. Universal banking, American-style, will assume a
form uniquely suited to our own fragmented, highly competitive
and potentially unstable financial markets.
I. UNIVERSAL BANKING AND DIVERSIFICATION
German banks are permitted by law to offer a full range of
commercial banking (lending) and investment banking (under-
writing and dealing) services.4 British deposit-taking banks en-
gage in merchant banking, usually through subsidiaries.5 Until
recently, Japanese banks were barred from underwriting,6 but
they have traditionally provided other securities-related services
and have even acted as advisers and agents for securities issu-
ers.' In both Europe and Japan, the trend is toward broadening
banking powers. Japanese banks are gradually gaining entry into
the underwriting business." European banks are moving into
4. For a brief description of relevant German, United Kingdom and Japanese laws,
see Alan J. Daskin & Jeffrey C. Marquardt, The Separation of Banking from Commerce
and the Securities Business in the United Kingdom, West Germany and Japan, 7 Is-
SUES IN BANK REG. 18 (1983).
5. Id. at 17.
6. Id. at 20.
7. Id. See also David G. Litt et al., Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets:
Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139
U. PA. L. Rav. 369, 381 (1990).
8. See James Sterngold, A Japanese-Style 'Old Boy' Network, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
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insurance.9
Economic theory suggests that diversification can limit
risk.10 In view of the decline of the traditional corporate lending
business in the United States," diversification might allow
banks to tap new profit sources. This theory supports the pro-
position that universal banks are more likely than fragmented
banks to be able to weather financial distress. So why not follow
the European example and allow United States banks to diver-
sify into financial or even non-financial businesses?
One response is that, as a practical matter, American banks
already have many of the powers of universal banks. In Europe,
United States bank affiliates participate actively in the securities
markets.12 In the United States, bank affiliates may engage in
limited amounts of corporate securities underwriting, including
underwriting equity offerings.1 " In the first half of 1992, J.P.
Morgan & Co. (the commercial banking firm, not to be confused
with the investment banking firm of Morgan Stanley) was lead
or co-manager of 2.8 billion dollars of public stock offerings 4
a substantial accomplishment for a banking company that first
received regulatory approval to underwrite equity in September
1990.15
1991, at Al, D6.
9. E.g., Friedrich K. Kilbler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Ger-
man Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 97, 99 n.17 (1991).
10. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 136 (4th ed. 1991).
11. This decline is dramatically illustrated by recent lending statistics. As of June
30, 1992, holdings of government securities by U.S. banks exceeded holdings of commer-
cial and industrial loans for the first time in 27 years. William Goodwin, Business Loans
Eclipsed By U.S. Bond Holdings, AM. BANKER, July 27, 1992, at 1. Commercial lending is
now one of the most foreign-dominated U.S. business sectors, surpassing even automo-
biles and chemicals. James R. Kraus, Foreign Banks Control 45% of Corporate Loans in
U.S., AM. BANKER, June 15, 1992, at 1.
12. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13) & (14) (1992) (permitting U.S. bank affiliates to
underwrite and deal in securities outside of the U.S.). Although equity underwriting and
dealing are subject to volume limitations (in the case of equity underwriting, $60 million
or 25% of Tier I capital per issuer), the regulations permit unlimited underwriting and
dealing in debt securities outside of the United States. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13)o&
(14)(ii).
13. J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., The Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust N.Y.
Corp., Citicorp and Security Pacific Corp., 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 192, 193 (1989) [here-
inafter J.P. Morgan et al.].
14. Kelley Holland, Dual Roles: Morgan Walks a Fine Line, Ahl. BANKER, July 1,
1992, at 10.
15. See Keith R. Fisher, Reweaving the Safety Net: Bank Diversification Into Se-
curities and Insurance Activities, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 158 & n.165 (1992).
19931
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Of course, Morgan is a strong bank. Many weaker banks
cannot take advantage of securities powers, in part because reg-
ulatory costs remain high. Banking organizations must receive
prior regulatory approval to set up securities affiliates in the
United States.16 Domestic securities affiliates are subject to com-
plex operating conditions designed to ensure compliance with
existing laws and to address the potential for conflicts of inter-
est.17 Were these regulatory costs to be reduced, would more
banks be able to diversify and, more importantly, take advan-
tage of the risk-reducing effects of diversification?
The answer is no, as the experience of successful universal
banks in both Germany and the United States demonstrates.
First, diversification theory has proved unworkable in practice
because most business firms diversify very poorly. Second, suc-
cessful universal banks are not really diversified at all. The key
to universal banking is cross-marketing, which means selling
more services to fewer customers. Broader product diversifica-
tion is offset by exposure to a narrower client base. Ironically,
the typical United States commercial bank is actually more di-
versified than its European counterpart. That may be its
problem.
A. Portfolio Theory: How Banks Are Taught to Diversify
Portfolio theory teaches that investors can reduce exposure
to firm-specific risk by buying securities whose returns are nega-
tively correlated.18 This theory is used to support the argument
that universal banks are less risky than fragmented banks. By
diversifying their product mix, the story goes, universal-banks
reduce their exposure to the highly cyclical commercial lending
business.
16. Individual applications must be made to the Federal Reserve Board under sec-
tion 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
The Board has stated that it will scrutinize each applicant's internal risk management
controls and operational and managerial infrastructure before granting underwriting
powers. See J.P. Morgan et al., supra note 13, at 217.
17. These so-called "firewalls" include revenue limitations on underwriting and
dealing in corporate securities (to comply with the Glass-Steagall Act's ban on affilia-
tions between banks and companies "engaged principally" in investment banking, 12
U.S.C. § 377 (1988)), and various regulatory restrictions on joint marketing and funding
of commercial and investment banking operations. For a list of the original 18 firewalls,
some of which have been or are in the process of being modified by the Federal Reserve
Board, see J.P. Morgan et al., supra note 13, at 214-17.
18. See Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
162 [Vol. XIX:I
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Corporate line-of-business diversification, however, has
never been shown to have the same risk-reducing effect as port-
folio diversification by securities investors. One reason is that
corporate diversification is costly. Starting a new line of business
requires substantial commitments of capital, expertise and time.
In the financial services industry, where reputation is key, entry
into new product markets is particularly difficult, as suggested
by the experience of several banks that, having quickly set up
securities affiliates when legal interpretations of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act permitted limited amounts of underwriting,19 closed
them just as quickly when earnings failed to justify expenses.2"
Alternatively, banks can diversify by acquiring established busi-
nesses, but they often wind up paying substantial premiums to
existing owners21 and incurring unanticipated integration costs,
including the cost of shedding unwanted operations.22
It is doubtful that these costs are outweighed by the risk-
reducing benefits of line-of-business diversification. This pro-
position is hard to test,23 but it is noteworthy that securities in-
vestors apparently do not place a premium on corporate diversi-
fication. To the contrary, in the 1970s and 1980s, investors
tended to discount the stock of diversified conglomerates, re-
19. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839
F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (interpreting Glass-Steagall provi-
sions forbidding affiliations between banks and firms "engaged principally" in securities
underwriting and dealing); see also supra text accompanying note 13.
20. E.g., Tom Leander, Bank of Boston Closes Sec. 20 Unit, AM. BANKER, June 5,
1990, at 2.
21. This was the experience in the early 1980s of banks that, looking to gain quick
entry into the then lucrative discount brokerage business, paid huge premiums for suc-
cessful franchises. Within six years, the discount brokerage business had lost its luster
and banks were forced to scale back their brokerage operations. See Jed Horowitz, Chase
May Sell Discount Brokerage Subsidiary, Am. BANKER, Nov. 8, 1988, at 3; see also J.
Nellie Liang & Donald T. Savage, The Nonbank Activities of Bank Holding Companies,
76 FED. RESERVE BULL. 280, 288 (1990) (Federal Reserve study of non-bank subsidiaries
of bank holding companies from 1986-1988 found discount brokerage to have been the
least profitable non-banking activity during this period).
22. These costs are discussed more fully in Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Fi-
nancial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49
MD. L. REv. 314, 338-41 (1990).
23. One problem is that some diversification costs, such as integration costs, are not
immediately apparent. Corporate experts estimate that the success or failure of an acqui-
sition cannot be measured for at least two years. John Kitching, Why Do Mergers Mis-
carry?, HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1967, at 85. Banking experts have asserted that, in
bank mergers, it takes an average of 22 years for the buyer finally to realize its targeted
return on investment. Joseph F. Sanchez, Comment/Mergers: Workout Time Proves Key
Measure, Am. BANKER, Nov. 14, 1990, at 18.
1993]
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flecting their own superior ability to diversify their stock portfo-
lios 24 and their lack of confidence in the efficiency of the con-
glomerate structure.25 The response of the non-banking sector
(and some banks) was to shed operations and move toward
greater specialization e.2  Although this evidence is anecdotal, it
does raise questions about the efficiency of diversification as a
corporate strategy."
In any event, the risk-reducing benefits of diversification are
achievable only if the firm combines businesses whose returns
are negatively correlated.28 Is this true of the kinds of financial
services that are offered by a universal bank? Advocates of bank
securities activities in the 1920s assumed so. One banker wrote
in 1929:
In periods when interest rates are low the commercial banking
business has its profit margin cut very drastically. At these
times the public is usually absorbing ... a large amount of
investment securities .... If the security affiliate of the bank
does a business of sufficient volume then its earnings will act as
an offset to the lowered profits of the commercial end.2 9
Is this assumption accurate? Empirical testing has been dif-
ficult, since, until recently, banks did not engage extensively in
securities operations.3 0 Nevertheless, at least one study that
compared the performance of separate banking and securities
firms found a positive correlation between returns on commer-
24. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Cor-
porate Web, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 33 n.88 (1986) (citing studies concluding that share-
holder diversification is more efficient than conglomerate diversification). Even small
savers can achieve portfolio diversification by investing in a diversified mutual fund.
25. Investors, apparently did not share the view of many economists that the supe-
rior monitoring ability of the conglomerate should (at least in theory) be value-enhanc-
ing. See OLIvER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 148 (1975).
26. For an analysis of this "deconglomeration" movement, see Coffee, supra note 24,
at 52-60.
27. This skepticism about the benefits of corporate diversification is shared by many
corporate governance experts. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 10, at 728-30;
Coffee, supra note 24, at 31-35.
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Simply put, the goal is to reduce
unique, or firm-specific, risk. If, at any given time, poor returns on one investment are
offset by high returns on other investments, total earnings variability is reduced.
29. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., Bank Security Companies, 119 BANKERS MAG. 927, 928
(1929).
30. For a discussion of some of the problems with past empirical studies of bank
diversification, see Garten, supra note 22, at 330-32.
[Vol. XlX:l
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cial and investment banking.31 (Analysis of investment portfolios
containing bank and securities company stocks may produce a
different result, but this analysis does not measure the effect of
combining lines of business. 32)
Moreover, financial markets have changed dramatically
since 1929. The high-grade corporate lending business has not
just suffered a cyclical downturn. It has all but disappeared. As
short-term debt markets expanded, commercial firms no longer
faced a choice between short-term bank financing and long-term
securities financing. Barring a major market disruption, highly
rated firms can always borrow more cheaply in the debt markets
than from banks. Commercial paper issues by non-financial
firms rose from ten percent of all short-term business borrowing
in the mid-1970s to twenty percent by the early 1980s."s Busi-
ness lending by the ten largest United States banks has steadily
declined since 1983.34
This suggests that, for many banks, the securities business
is less an adjunct than an alternative to traditional corporate
lending. Moreover, what lending business remains is often linked
to the securities markets. For example, a major portion of a
bank's current lending business may consist of issuing back-up
31. See Roger D. Stover, A Re-Examination of Bank Holding Company Acquisi-
tions, 13 J. BANK RES., Summer 1982, at 101, 105. Of course, this is just one study.
Subsequent researchers may quarrel with its methodology and results; in fact, the Stover
study was an attempt to correct methodological problems identified in prior studies. This
illustrates another problem with past empirical testing of bank diversification. Since re-
searchers still disagree over how best to measure the risk-reducing effects of corporate
diversification, definitive conclusions based on empirical data are elusive.
32. See Garten, supra note 22, at 317. A problem with applying the lessons of port-
folio diversification to line-of-business diversification is that, unlike securities investors,
business firms do not necessarily treat each line of business as a separate (and passive)
investment. Banking companies in particular have tended to integrate the administra-
tion, funding and marketing of separate product lines. As a result, the fortunes of differ-
ent businesses become intertwined. See Garten, supra note 22, at 366-67. This may ex-
plain why studies of real bank holding companies have found that the profit rates of
bank and non-bank subsidiaries have actually moved in tandem. See Liang & Savage,
supra note 21, at 287; see also infra note 63.
33. Timothy D. Rowe, Commercial Paper, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND,
INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 121 (Timothy Q. Cook & Timothy D. Rowe eds.,
1986). Despite some recent credit quality problems, the commercial paper market re-
mains active (estimated at $740 billion as of 1991) and an efficient source of funds for
highly rated borrowers - once the banks' most reliable and lucrative customers.
Jonathan Fuerbringer, Commercial Paper Has Troubles, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1991,
§ 3, at 4.
34. See Table: Business Lending by Banks in the U.S., AM. BANKER, June 18, 1992,
at 10.
1993]
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lines of credit to support customers' commercial paper or short-
term debt programs. 5 The same bank may act as agent in plac-
ing corporate debt securities with investors (although, under
current regulatory interpretations, the bank may not perform
both services in connection with the same debt issuance .3 ) This
means that when market conditions are favorable for debt issu-
ances, the diversified bank earns both securities placement fees
and commitment fees for back-up credit.
When market conditions are unfavorable, debt issuers may
draw on their back-up lines of credit, but this is not necessarily
good news for the bank despite the promise of interest income.
Unlike unused lines of credit, loans have to be funded. If the
bank's own funding costs are high, as is true today for many
banks, interest margins will be thin. Moreover, if the issuer can-
not sell debt because of a ratings downgrade or other adverse
financial development, the lending bank will be taking a signifi-
cant credit risk. Interest earnings may not compensate for lost
securities-related income.
In any case, United States banks that have entered the se-
curities business have not followed a diversification strategy
aimed at achieving "balanced earning power. ' 37 Instead, they
have become highly specialized, eschewing broad diversification
in order to dominate particular product markets. As will be
shown, European-style universal banks have followed the same
path.
B. How Successful Universal Banks Diversify
Although the United States may be alone in mandating fi-
nancial specialization as a matter of law, even universal banking
systems exhibit considerable de facto specialization. In Ger-
many, for example, all banks have universal banking powers, but
only a handful, of the over 4000 German banks actually under-
write securities.38 The banking industry is divided into three
35. As of the second quarter of 1990, $743 billion of these unused credit commit-
ments were outstanding. Steven Lipin, Unused Credits Of $743 Billion Seen As Stimu-
lus, AM. BANKER, Nov. 30, 1990, at 1.
36. See J.P. Morgan et al., supra note 13, at 214 (forbidding banks to issue letters
of credit enhancing creditworthiness of securities underwritten or distributed by their
securities affiliates); but see J.P. Morgan & Company Inc., 76 FED. RESERVE BULL. 26,
27-28 (1990) (permitting extensions of credit to underwriting customers where proceeds
are used to pay off the debt at maturity).
37. Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 928.
38. Herman H. Kailfass, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor:
[Vol. XIX:I
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main segments: the public sector banks, which act as savings
banks; the cooperative banks; and the private (commercial)
banks."9 Underwriting syndicates are dominated by the "Big
Three" private banks: Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerzbank. 0
German banks also participate in the industrial sector by exer-
cising voting rights on behalf of individual shareholders in Ger-
man corporations.41 Again, the Big Three dominate. As of the
end of 1984, they controlled the voting rights of approximately
forty-three percent of all investment portfolios.42
Japan has an even more complex pyramidal banking struc-
ture which includes, from bottom to top, small credit associa-
tions and cooperatives (numbering in the thousands), shinkin
(retail and small business lenders), sogo (originally, savings
banks), regional banks, and the giant city, long-term and trust
banks.43 (Recently, however, Japan's fragmented banking mar-
kets have been merging as a result of the decline of the tradi-
tional corporate lending business. As their borrowers have de-
fected to the securities markets, the largest banks have invaded
the local lending markets traditionally served by shinkin.44) The
Japanese keiretsu, or bank-dominated corporate groupings, are
responsible for further market fragmentation, allowing business
firms to rely on their group bank for most of their financial
needs.45
Thus, the German and Japanese banking markets are highly
segmented, with different banks serving different economic sec-
tors (e.g., large corporations, small businesses, individual bor-
rowers) and different clients within each sector. German private
banks have stable, long-term relationships with corporate cus-
tomers that tend to obtain most or all of their financial services
Are There Lessons From Abroad? The German Experience, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
775, 779.
39. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 14.
40. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 779. As of December 31, 1991, based on total assets,
Bayerische Vereinsbank narrowly outranked Commerzbank as the third largest German
banking institution. Deutsche and Dresdner remained first and second, respectively. See
Table: Top 500 Banks by Country, Am. BANKER, July 27, 1992, at 26A.
41. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 782.
42. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 783.
43. Henny Sender, Japan's not-so-mighty banks, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov.
1990, at 130.
44. Id. at 131-32.
45. For a description of the keiretsu, see Marie Anchordoguy, A Brief History of
Japan's Keiretsu, HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1990, at 58.
1993]
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from their banks.46 Japanese keiretsu banks traditionally have
enjoyed similar relationships with group members.'7
Product markets are also segmented. German universal
banks have the power to offer any kind of investment or com-
mercial banking product, but the range of services that is actu-
ally available is narrow by American standards. For example,
German banks have not entered the lucrative field of merger and
acquisition advice - a growth area for United States banks in
the 1980s - because, in Germany, hostile takeovers have been
virtually unknown.48 German banks have also been slow to offer
their corporate clients sophisticated financial products such as
derivatives, swaps, futures and options.'9 With the exception of
Deutsche Bank, German banks have not participated extensively
in the Eurobond market or in other international securities
markets.50
Instead, German banks have concentrated on providing
traditional capital market services, mainly loans and securities
placement, in domestic markets. The extent of this de facto spe-
cialization is illustrated by recent attempts by German banks to
position themselves to compete more effectively in integrated
European markets. For example, Deutsche Bank, called by one
observer "the most universal of all universal banks,"5' 1 had to
acquire Morgan Grenfell & Co., a London merchant bank, to
gain instant expertise in merger advice and investment
46. Kfibler, supra note 9, at 103 (describing this "Hausbank" function). At least for
large German firms, credit relationships may not be exclusive. Publicly held firms may
maintain multiple main-bank relationships (reflecting their demand for capital). See
Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks, 40 AM. J.
Co p. L. 503, 508 (1992). Nevertheless, these firms' reliance on banks for securities un-
derwriting (and these same banks' control of voting power) suggest the logic of stable,
long-term banking relationships. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 72-96.
47. In Japan, this may be changing as the largest corporations are forced to look
beyond their keiretsu banks for financing, thereby breaking established banking-corpo-
rate ties. For further discussion of the implications of this change for Japanese banking,
see infra text accompanying notes 87-95.
48. Kilbler, supra note 9, at 102. One reason for the absence of a takeover market
may be the concentration of corporate ownership and voting power in the hands of banks
and other corporations. See infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
49. James R. Kraus, Solid German Banks May See Profit Slump in '92, Am.
BANKER, July 27, 1992, at 8A-9A.
50. Id. at 9A.
51. Anthony D. Loehnis, EC on Its Way to Integrating Markets, AM. BANKER, Dec.
16, 1991, at 1A, 3A.
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management.2
This evidence suggests that the typical diversification strat-
egy of the German universal bank has been the joint marketing
of a limited number of financial products (typically lending and
securities placement) to a stable group of corporate clients. This
strategy has been followed by American banks that have suc-
cessfully entered the securities business. The key to successful
universal banking, American-style, is to offer more services to
fewer customers - a strategy that worked well for the old
House of Morgan and other private banks that operated in pre-
Glass-Steagall banking markets. The House of Morgan provided
"cradle to grave" financial services to long-term corporate cli-
ents,53 including lending, underwriting, providing financial ad-
vice and voting proxies on behalf of public shareholders." The
House of Morgan was not a "full service" bank. It did not hold a
diversified lending portfolio. It did not offer an array of financial
products to the public. It did not maintain any presence in retail
or even small business markets. 55
Modern-day approaches to diversification are remarkably
similar. Today's J.P. Morgan (successor to the old House of
Morgan's banking business) 56 has been successful in marketing a
combination of wholesale financial products, typically credit
lines, underwriting and financial products, to long-time Morgan
clients such as General Motors and Hospital Corporation of
America.5 Some observers have suggested that Morgan's success
reflects its ability to build on corporate lending relationships to
cross-market securities services.58 For example, when Security
Pacific was unable to roll over five billion dollars of its commer-
52. Id.
53. Actually, "grave to cradle" may be more accurate, since many Morgan clients,
including General Electric and New York Central, were products of reorganizations of
troubled companies engineered by Morgan. See RON CHERNOw, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN:
AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 66-67 (1990).
54. One critic characterized these stable bank-client relationships as putting the
bank at the center of a "web of economic interests." A. A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock
and "Bankers' Control", 39 HARv. L. REV. 673, 676 (1926).
55. See JOSEPH AUERBACH & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, INVESTMENT BANKING AND DII-
GENCE: WHAT PRICE DEREGULATION? 13 (1986).
56. The Glass-Steagall Act, adopted in 1933, forced Morgan and other universal
banks to choose between commercial and investment banking. Morgan chose commercial
banking. The new firm of Morgan Stanley was formed to take over the bank's securities
business. See CHERNOW, supra note 53, at 385-91.
57. Holland, supra note 14, at 1.
58. Of course, the actual tying of banking and securities products is illegal under the
Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988).
1993]
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cial paper, Morgan put together a bank syndicate to provide a
one billion dollar emergency line of credit. Morgan was then
named agent on Security Pacific's medium-term note program.
As one banker commented: "When Morgan comes to the rescue
[with credit], they have quite a nice call on a firm after that."5
Thus, Morgan's strategy is to sell a package of related capi-
tal market services to large corporate clients. Ironically, as the
corporate lending business shrinks, wholesale banks like Morgan
may become even more specialized, offering only securities-
related products. One universal-style United States bank that
has already moved in this direction is Bankers Trust, which has
not operated a retail branch since 1982.0 Bankers Trust has
concentrated on developing a package of sophisticated invest-
ment products, such as index funds for institutional investors,
derivatives and foreign currency trading, designed primarily for
the wholesale market. Although the bank is now seeking to ex-
pand its customer base by offering proprietary mutual funds
through other financial institutions, this move simply builds on
existing expertise in investment services. 1 The strategy is spe-
cialization, not diversification.
C. How United States Commercial Banks Have Diversified
Compared with German banks (and United States wholesale
banks like Morgan and Bankers Trust), most United States
commercial banks are already highly diversified. Within the ex-
isting legal framework (and even before recent legal interpreta-
tions permitting bank securities activities), banks have been able
to achieve extensive product diversification, combining services
such as corporate and consumer lending, home and commercial
mortgages, trust banking, stock transfers, leasing and data
processing, market diversification, serving both retail and busi-
ness customers, and even geographical diversification.6 2 Empiri-
cal studies have found that the returns on some of these busi-
nesses, notably commercial finance and home mortgage lending,
may be negatively correlated with returns on commercial lend-
59. Holland, supra note 14, at 10.
60. Ellen Braitman, Bankers Trust Seeking Approval to Expand Mutual Fund
Business, Am. BANKER, June 18, 1992, at 1.
61. See id. at 12.
62. Despite restrictions on interstate branching, banks have found ways to collect
deposits and make loans in national markets. See H. Rodgin Cohen, Interstate Banking:
Myth and Reality, 18 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 965 (1985).
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ing, providing diversification potential. 3
Nevertheless, in recent decades, many banks have come to
view diversification as a curse rather than a blessing. The Penn
Square-Continental fiasco highlighted the dangers of lending
outside of a bank's home base without local expertise.64 Poor
bank performance in ancillary businesses such as consumer fi-
nance and mortgage banking compared with independent ri-
vals6 5 has encouraged diversified banks to shrink.6 Unsuccessful
attempts by diversified non-bank financial institutions such as
Prudential-Bache to be all things to all customers provide a cau-
tionary tale for banks.6 7 Today, specialization and outsourcing
have replaced the construction of financial supermarkets as pre-
ferred management strategies.
This does not mean that diversification cannot work. Per-
haps United States banks diversified too much rather than
choosing new businesses on the basis of their contribution to an
efficient portfolio." Alternatively, bank managers may simply
63. E.g., Stover, supra note 31, at 105. Likewise, intercorrelations among different
non-banking businesses offer additional diversification potential for the bank that com-
bines commercial banking with several non-banking activities. Stover, supra note 31, at
106. Nevertheless, a Federal Reserve study of actual non-bank subsidiaries of bank hold-
ing companies between 1986 and 1988 found that, although commercial finance and
mortgage banking were (along with securities brokerage) the most significant non-bank-
ing activities for diversified bank holding companies, aggregate yearly profit rates for
bank and non-bank subsidiaries actually moved in tandem, raising questions about the
potential gains from diversification. See Liang & Savage, supra note 21, at 287; see also
supra note 32.
64. As part of an effort to diversify its loan portfolio, Chicago's Continental Illinois
bought participations in oil and gas loans from Oklahoma's Penn Square Bank, relying
on Penn Square for credit monitoring and documentation. When a number of its borrow-
ers defaulted, Penn Square failed and Continental suffered large losses, requiring a
costly government bailout. See Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental
Illinois National Bank: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Su-
pervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Ur-
ban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
65. E.g., Samuel H. Talley, Bank Holding Company Performance In Consumer Fi-
nance and Mortgage Banking, 52 MAG. BANK ADMIN., July 1976, at 42 (finding that
bank-affiliated mortgage and consumer finance companies had lower returns on equity
than the industry average). This particular study covered 1973-1974, and may not reflect
recent experience. On the other hand, at that time, bank holding company affiliates actu-
ally enjoyed lower average funding costs than their independent rivals. Id. at 44.
66. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
67. See Managerial Brief: Not So Prudent, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 1991, at 59
(describing failed effort by Prudential-Bache, the retail brokerage-insurance conglomer-
ate, to enter wholesale investment banking).
68. This charge has been made by Peter C. Eisenmann, Diversification and the
Congeneric Bank Holding Company, 7 J. BANK RES. 68, 75-77 (1976).
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have been unskilled in operating a diversified conglomerate .6
Nevertheless, experience does suggest that relying on line-of-
business diversification for risk reduction is itself a risky bank-
ing strategy. Certainly, it does not account for the financial vi-
tality of the universal bank.7
II. UNIVERSAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT
If diversification cannot explain the stability of the univer-
sal banking model, why are universal banks seemingly failure-
resistant? The answer may lie in the relationship between uni-
versal banks and their customers. In Germany and Japan, cross-
holdings of stock between banks and their corporate clients are
common. Nevertheless, equity investment is simply one of many
financial ties that bind banking and commercial concerns. These
ties provide a motive for banks to support their customers in
times of financial hardship, 71 but the converse is true as well:
Bank customers are a source of financial and managerial
strength for their banks. This particular strain of the universal
banking model, however, shows no sign of taking root in the
United States.72
69. For some of the reasons why this may have been so, see Garten, supra note 22,
at 365-69.
70. Some advocates of expanded bank powers may agree, but may argue that risk
reduction can be achieved by encouraging banks to abandon unprofitable lending alto-
gether and to concentrate on higher valued businesses. In the early 1980s, many non-
bank firms were eager to acquire deposit-taking institutions that did not make any com-
mercial loans (the so-called "non-bank banks"). Banks may prosper by following a simi-
lar route, combining their deposit-taking powers with securities, insurance or other
nonlending businesses.
This strategy may make sense for some banks, given the current state of the corpo-
rate lending business, but it is not universal banking, at least as practiced successfully by
the universal banks of Europe. As the next section of this paper will discuss, European
universal banks, particularly the German banks, are still primarily business lenders. Sta-
ble lending relationships not only facilitate the cross-marketing of universal banking ser-
vices; they also may be the real reason why universal banks successfully weather finan-
cial distress.
71. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Helen A. Garten, Institutional
Investors and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 585 (1992).
72. This section offers a model of bank-client relationships in universal banking sys-
tems. Although the German and Japanese experience offers considerable support for this
model, further empirical study is necessary. Moreover, the model offers only a partial
explanation of the stability of universal banking systems. See infra text accompanying
note 134.
FINANCIAL STABILITY
A. Bank-Client Relationships in Universal Banking Systems
The universal banking strategy of offering multiple financial
services to corporate clients has facilitated the building of re-
markably stable banking relationships. As previously suggested,
most universal bank clients maintain one or more main-bank re-
lationships that may involve credit and secfirities services. 3 The
marketing strategies of United States-style universal banks also
appear to be based on- fashioning new "webs of economic inter-
ests" between corporate clients and their banks.74
Stable client relationships may strengthen banks in several
ways. Long-term relationships enhance the predictability of
earnings, improving the bank's ability to manage risk. In addi-
tion, stable relationships facilitate credit monitoring. When
bankers know their customers well, they are better able to assess
credit quality and to identify potential problems. Likewise,
when their clients depend on long-term banking relationships
for credit and other banking services, bankers have more lever-
age to bargain for stringent credit controls in their loan agree-
ments or tQ insist on other monitoring devices, such as represen-
tation on their borrowers' boards of directors.
Stable client relationships may benefit banks in a more di-
rect way. Once corporate clients build long-term relationships
with their banks, they have a financial stake in the continuation
of those relationships. This provides a motive for commercial
firms to help their banks to weather financial crises. In Ger-
many, for example, credit monitoring is a two-way street.1 5
Banks own shares in and influence the management of their cor-
porate borrowers. "6 Likewise, large industrial corporations own
shares in and appoint representatives to the supervisory boards
of their banks, including the "Grossbanken."77
These corporate-banking partnerships mean that, in the
event of a banking crisis, the industrial sector has strong incen-
tives to provide financial support to the banking industry. More
importantly, corporate influence may shape bank management
policy ex ante. Symbiotic bank-customer relationships encourage
mutual risk aversion. Banks obviously have an interest in avert-
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
75. K~ibler, supra note 9, at 109.
76. Deutsche Bank, for example, holds a 28.5% stake in Daimler-Benz. Kilbler,
supra note 9, at 100.
77. Kfibler, supra note 9, at 109.
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ing the failure of major borrowers. Likewise, large bank clients
have reason to fear bank failure and the resulting disruption of
banking services. This suggests that corporate customers have
reason to insist that their banks adopt risk averse management
strategies. 8
So do universal banks prosper because their customers will
not let them fail? The story is actually a little more complex. In
both Germany and Japan, for example, the stable bank-client
relationships that we associate with universal banking developed
as a defensive response to thin or uncompetitive capital markets.
In Japan, domestic capital shortages after World War II, cou-
pled with fear of foreign dominance of Japanese capital markets,
led to the formation of the bank-centered keiretsu.79 From 1950
through 1980, Japanese firms obtained most of their external fi-
nancing from bank loans.80 Even when firms issued new securi-
ties, they generally could count on their group bank (and other
group members) to subscribe for a portion of the new shares,
thereby keeping corporate control in friendly hands.8 1
In Germany, long-term bank-client ties are also the product
of underdeveloped domestic capital markets. As of the end of
1985, equity instruments accounted for only 7.2 percent of net
long-term obligations of nonfinancial companies. Bank loans ac-
counted for 64.4 percent.82 Public securities markets are thin
compared with United States markets. Access to the markets is
controlled by the largest banks, which, through bank syndicates,
dominate securities placement and admission to trading on the
stock exchanges. 83 In the past, bank fees for securities under-
writing have been high, discouraging first-time issuers.84 From
1986 to 1987, only forty-five new German companies were admit-
ted to the German stock exchange. In contrast, 2,108 new Amer-
ican companies were admitted to United States exchanges in the
78. Kiibler, supra note 9, at 109.
79. See Anchordoguy, supra note 45, at 58.
80. Jack McDonald, The Mochiai Effect: Japanese Corporate Cross-holdings, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall 1989, at 90, 93.
81. Id. at 93.
82. Kailfass, supra note 38, at 785-86 n.38.
83. Kailfass, supra note 38, at 779-80. The absence of significant government super-
vision of the securities markets has encouraged German banks to act as private market
regulators. Although this has undoubtedly protected investors from risky issuers and un-
fair trading practices, it also has prevented entry into the securities business by new
(non-bank) financial intermediaries. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 779.
84. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 780.
[Vol. XIX:I
FINANCIAL STABILITY
same period.8 5 By exercising proxies on behalf of individual
equityholders, German banks account for roughly ninety percent
of the votes in publicly held firms. s6
This suggests that long-term banking relationships survive
because of the absence of efficient alternatives for capital-seek-
ing firms. Universal banks can control access to capital so long
as public capital is scarce, as was the case in post-war Japan, or
so long as banks are able to satisfy the commercial sector's de-
mand for external financing, as apparently is still true in Ger-
many.87 Since corporate customers depend on the banking rela-
tionship for access to funds, bank stability is a high priority for
the corporate sector.
Conversely, as capital markets mature and expand, long-
term banking relationships become less important. This has
happened in Japan over the last decade as Japanese companies
have become global in operation. These firms have been forced
to look beyond the banking system for financing by raising funds
in revitalized domestic securities markets 8 and in the interna-
tional capital markets.8 9 As a result, keiretsu ties are loosening.
Huge city banks such as Mitsubishi have lost their traditional
client base of large corporate borrowers. As of 1991, seventy-five
percent of Mitsubishi's domestic loans were to individuals and
small businesses.90
If stable client ties are a significant source of financial
strength for banks, Japanese banks may now be contemplating
the loss of this support at the time when they most need it. Re-
cent events have called into question the stability of the Japa-
nese banking system.91 Like their United States counterparts,
85. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 775-76 n.2.
86. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 782.
87. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1991). One reason that banks con-
tinue to dominate the German credit markets is that German firms do not have to bor-
row very often, relying instead on internally generated funds, including reserves set aside
to fund corporate pensions. See Kallfass, supra note 38, at 789. When German firms do
borrow, German banks can still satisfy loan demand, removing the need for alternative
funding sources. Moreover, German banks' access to inexpensive capital (and their con-
trol over underwriting fees) can keep loan rates low relative to other funding sources. See
infra text accompanying notes 93-98.
88. For a discussion of the recent growth of the Japanese commercial paper market,
see Litt et al., supra note 7, at 423-28.
89. See generally McDonald, supra note 80, at 93.
90. See Japanese Banking: Mitsubeautiful, THE ECONoMisT, Feb. 9, 1991, at 86
[hereinafter Mitsubeautiful].
91. See Robert M. Garsson, Japanese Banks Are Poised on a Precipice, AM.
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Japanese banks are experiencing unprecedented financial diffi-
culties.2 The loss of stable corporate lending relationships has
encouraged Japanese banks to diversify into unfamiliar lending
areas, including high risk real estate lending. Interest rate dereg-
ulation has put additional pressure on bank earnings.9 3 The re-
sults in Japan have been the same as in the United States. Prob-
lem loans are mounting, estimated in 1992 to amount to as much
as 418 billion dollars. 4 The debt ratings of some large Japanese
banks have been lowered. 5
These persistent problems besetting a banking industry that
has heretofore been virtually failure-free suggest that the
keiretsu relationship can no longer be counted on as -an effective
source of monitoring and financial support for Japanese banks.
Moreover, even the Japanese government appears reluctant to
restore the banking industry to its former glory. According to
recent reports, the government would prefer to use the current
banking crisis to bring about a long-term reduction in the size
and role of the banking system. This may signal a growing con-
sensus that, as banker dominance of the credit markets wanes, a
stable banking sector is no longer considered essential to a sta-
ble industrial sector.
B. Stable Capital
Long-term client relationships may also ensure universal
banks access to stable, low-cost capital. As central bankers in
BANKER, July 27, 1992, at 10A.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Mitsubishi and Dai-Ichi Debt Is Downgraded, Am. BANKER, Aug. 26, 1992,
at 7.
96. See International News: Japanese Banks Seen Facing Tough Decade, Am.
BANKER, June 12, 1992, at 12. It is still unlikely that Japan will actually allow its banks
to fail. Maintaining international confidence in the stability of its financial markets re-
mains important government policy. See infra text accompanying notes 161-64. More-
over, in 1992, concern over a possible credit crunch in some business sectors seemed to
be forcing the government to offer financial assistance to the banking sector by interven-
ing to support real estate prices, despite its stated reluctance to use public monies to
prop up bank profits. See International News: Japan's Recovery Called Dependent on
Bank Lending, AM. BANKER, Aug. 12, 1992, at 9. In late October 1992, the government
announced a plan to allow banks to sell troubled real estate loans to a newly formed
corporation to be capitalized by the banking industry. Although the government still
insisted that public funds would not be contributed, the plan did contemplate significant
tax breaks for banks. James Sterngold, Japan Says Bad Bank Loans Soared by 50% in
Six Months, N.Y. TnMEs, Oct. 31, 1992, at 37, 48.
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industrialized nations have moved toward the adoption of uni-
form minimum capital requirements, patient capital has become
increasingly important for banks. 7 In Germany, important bank
customers often hold long-term equity stakes in their banks.98 In
Japan, the keiretsu was characterized by complex equity cross-
holdings that ensured that some percentage of bank stock re-
mained permanently in the hands of friendly bank clients.9
Because these equity stakes serve primarily as a source of
monitoring and influence rather than as an investment for
profit, they are seldom if ever traded. Banks are insulated to a
degree from the vicissitudes of the competitive capital markets.
Moreover, when banks need to raise new capital, existing cus-
tomer-shareholders that want to prevent dilution of their inter-
ests have an incentive to buy new shares.
Long-term customer relationships may also enable banks to
attract deposits from corporate clients and their employees. This
may help to explain why German banks traditionally have en-
joyed a stable low-cost deposit base.100 In Japan, keiretsu con-
nections may be breaking down as corporate firms look beyond
banks for funding, but keiretsu banks can still count on stable
retail deposits collected from employees of group companies. 01
The link between stable corporate-banking relationships
and stable deposits has another explanation. Both are products
of relatively undeveloped securities markets. Savers favor bank
deposits because of the limited number of investment alterna-
tives. In Germany, for example, individual participation in the
public securities markets is low. Roughly half of all listed stock
is held by the corporate sector. 10 2 These blocks of equity are
held less for investment than as a way to cement inter-corporate
relationships and are rarely traded. As of 1990, only six percent
of firms listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange had over half of
their stock in public float.103 Investment funds for small savers
comparable to United States mutual funds are practically
97. See Helen A. Garten, Whatever Happened to Market Discipline of Banks?,
1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 749 (1992).
98. See supra text accompanying note 77.
99. For example, as of 1989, within the Mitsubishi group, Mitsubishi Corporation
owned 1.9% of Mitsubishi Bank. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries owned another 3.5% of
the bank's stock. McDonald, supra note 80, at 90.
100. Buxbaum, supra note 87, at 37.
101. Mitsubeautiful, supra note 90, at 87.
102. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 786.
103. Buxbaum, supra note 87, at 19 n.72.
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nonexistent.10 4
The experience in the United States has been very different.
Pension funds and, to a lesser degree, mutual funds have
emerged as significant savings vehicles for individual investors,
channelling their funds into the corporate securities markets.
Active short-term debt markets such as the market for commer-
cial paper offer a highly liquid alternative to deposits both for
direct investors and for money market mutual funds which in
turn can offer deposit-like liquidity to small savers. The result
has been disintermediation: the outflow of both corporate and
retail savings from bank deposits into investment alternatives.
Why are these alternatives more readily available in the
United States than in Germany? One reason is that, as securities
have replaced bank loans as a significant source of external
funding for United States business firms, the securities markets
have expanded and matured, offering more choices and greater
liquidity for investors. In Germany, banks still dominate credit.
Since most business firms do not have to resort frequently to the
securities markets for financing, direct investment opportunities
are fewer. Bank deposits remain the primary vehicle for chan-
nelling savers' funds to the end users of capital.
The connection between a stable deposit base and a stable
banking system is also demonstrated by the United States expe-
rience. In the 1950s, deposits were so plentiful that many United
States banks did not pay any interest at all on corporate time
accounts. 10 5 Since the 1980s, disintermediation has meant higher
funding costs, increased liquidity risks and lower net interest
margins for the United States banking industry.
The universal banking model does not by itself guarantee a
stable deposit base. French banks have universal banking pow-
ers, yet they have lost deposits to tax-advantaged money market
mutual funds - funds which they have promoted themselves.10
There are indications that German banks may have protected
their deposit base by deliberately suppressing rate competi-
104. Kiibler, supra note 9, at 99; see also Thomas Christian Paefgen, Institutional
Investors Ante Portas: A Comparative Analysis of an Emergent Force in Corporate
America and Germany, 26 INT'L LAW. 327, 328 (1992). German investment companies
tend to be subsidiaries of banks. See Baums, supra note 46, at 505 n.16.
105. George W. McKinney, Jr., New Sources of Bank Funds: Certificates of Deposit
and Debt Securities, 32 LAW & CO= rMP. PROBS. 71, 72 (1967).
106. Phil Roosevelt, French Show Vulnerability to Financial Industry Woes, AM.
BANKER, July 27, 1992, at 17A.
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tion.10 7 Recently, however, even German banks have begun to
offer market rates to depositors."' 8 In Japan, deregulation of de-
posit interest rates has already had an adverse effect on bank
profits.109 Thus, although universal banks may still be able to
use stable client ties to market deposits, as investment alterna-
tives become more widely available and depositors demand com-
petitive rates of return from their banks, even universal banks
will experience higher funding costs and disintermediation.
C. Can We Copy the Universal Banking Model?
Some United States banking reformers would try to
reproduce the stable bank-client relationships of the universal
banking model by changing the law to permit corporate firms to
own banks.110 Ideally, corporate owners would have the same in-
centives as, say, German industrial firms to provide ongoing
monitoring and financial support for their banks.
As the previous section has suggested, however, German
firms have an interest in the stability of their banks because
they still depend on banks for most of their financial needs.
Ongoing business ties are likely to encourage mutual risk aver-
sion and provide incentives for failure avoidance.1
In contrast, as a "pure" shareholder, a United States com-
mercial firm may have no more incentive than today's bank
owners to prevent bank failure. First, corporate owners are likely
to be diversified, which in theory should allow them to tolerate
more risk than undiversified stakeholders.1 1 2 Second, debt-domi-
nated bank capital structures and bank regulation actually cre-
ate disincentives for corporate owners to rescue ailing bank affil-
iates. If the corporate owner contributes new capital, most of its
investment will go to pay off depositors' claims. If the corporate
owner refuses to invest new money and the bank fails, the insur-
107. See, e.g., Germany Probing How Biggest Banks Set Rates on Savings, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 26, 1992, at 7 (government probe into alleged price fixing by largest banks
to keep deposit rates low).
108. Kraus, supra note 49, at 8A.
109. Garsson, supra note 91, at 10A.
110. E.g., TREASURY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 56-57. Such affiliations are
now forbidden by section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)
(1988).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
112. This may not be true if, as I have argued with respect to bank holding compa-
nies, conglomerate managers have a reputational stake in averting the failure of any
business unit. See Garten, supra note 22, at 359-61.
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ance fund must reimburse depositors. Thus, once a bank affiliate
begins to experience financial difficulty, the corporate owner has
reason to shield healthy assets from bank creditors, shifting the
cost of failure resolution to the deposit insurance fund. In the
past, bank owners have often tried to walk away from their fail-
ing banks, leaving the government to sift through the
wreckage." 3
So is the answer to allow cross-ownership and unlimited fi-
nancial interconnections between commercial and banking
firms? This approach would be far more radical than past re-
form proposals, all of which have included some "firewalls"
preventing funds transfers and other financial transactions be-
tween a bank and its commercial owner.1 1 4 Nevertheless, even
complete deregulation would not necessarily reproduce the sta-
ble symbiotic relationships of the universal banking model. The
problem, simply put, is competition. In the highly competitive
United States financial services markets, corporate borrowers
simply have too many choices to be willing to risk their capital
to save their banks. Moreover, most observers see this as a
strength, not a weakness, of the United States financial system.
1. A Historical Detour: Henry Ford and the Michigan
Banking Crisis of 1933
Before 1933, the United States did have a version of the
universal bank. Legal lines of demarcation between permissible
and impermissible banking activities had not yet been clearly
drawn and banks could diversify fairly freely.11 5 Private banks
like the House of Morgan guided large corporate clients through
the capital raising process, offering loans, securities underwrit-
ing, restructuring advice and shareholders' services, including
113. This problem has caused bank regulators to try to force bank holding compa-
nies to contribute capital to troubled subsidiary banks. See, e.g., MCorp Fin., Inc. v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991). See also infra text accompanying notes 168-69
(describing statutory provisions mandating capital contributions by affiliated entities). If
today's bank holding company will not voluntarily contribute non-bank assets to assist
its bank, it is unclear why diversified commercial owners will be any more willing to do
SO.
114. E.g., TREASURY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 59 (endorsing financial and
disclosure firewalls between insured banks and non-bank affiliates).
115. Modern legal restrictions on diversification were the product of the Banking
Act of 1933 (separating banks and securities firms) and the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 (separating banks and commercial firms).
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voting proxies for stockholders.116 By the 1920s, even traditional
deposit-lending banks like Chase National Bank and National
City Bank were engaging in securities activities through
affiliates. 11
7
Were these banks able to build the stable client relation-
ships that would see them through periods of financial distress?
Some banks, notably the successful private banks, were stronger
than most of their clients and never needed their help. After the
stock market crash of 1929, the House of Morgan's net worth
dropped,118 but Morgan and its affiliated banks were hardly in
danger of failing.
But what about those banks that were threatened? Did
long-standing client relationships provide a source of strength?
One anecdote is revealing. In February 1933, Union Guardian
Trust, one of Michigan's two largest banks, was close to insol-
vency. The Hoover Administration was ready to lend to the
bank through the newly created Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration (RFC), but only if Henry Ford, a large depositor, was will-
ing to subordinate his deposit liabilities to the government's
loan. Ford was not just a major bank customer. A member of the
Ford family had served on the bank's board and Ford had pro-
vided financial support to the bank in the past."9
This time, however, although the bank's failure was immi-
nent, Ford refused to help and even threatened to withdraw
twenty million dollars of corporate deposits from Michigan's
other main bank. 120 The RFC did not make the loan, the gover-
nor of Michigan was forced to proclaim a bank holiday and
panic spread quickly through the rest of the banking industry.'
21
For many observers, this marked the beginning of the banking
crisis that eventually led to the nationwide bank holiday of
March 1933.122
Interestingly, in 1916, Henry Ford had turned down an offer
from the House of Morgan to take his company public.'23 Later,
116. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
117. Perkins, supra note 3, at 492.
118. See CHERNOW, supra note 53, at 349.
119. See JESSE H. JONES, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS: My THIRTEEN YEARS WITH THE
RFC (1932-1945), at 58 (1951).
120. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF RoOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE
OLD ORDER 1919-33, at 475 (1956).
121. Id. at 476.
122. Id. at 475.
123. CHERNOW, supra note 53, at 222.
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Morgan did underwrite a securities offering for rival GM and
played an active role in rescuing GM when, shortly after the
public offering, GM's stock price plummeted, leaving the under-
writers holding quantities of unsold shares.124 Thereafter, GM
remained a loyal Morgan client. In contrast, Henry Ford appar-
ently did not need Morgan, Union Guardian Trust or any other
bank for continued access to capital or other financial services.
As a result, he did not have sufficient incentives to ensure their
survival when they experienced financial distress. 125
2. Modern Examples: The United States Version of the
Universal Bank
Today's quasi-universal banks, like Morgan and Bankers
Trust, are successfully marketing related financial services to cli-
ents. Nevertheless, they are not likely to build the symbiotic re-
lationships that are central to the universal banking model.
First, the quasi-universal bank faces substantial competition
both in the market for linked financial services and in each indi-
vidual product market. For example, universal banks may offer
clients a package of capital market services, including lending
plus underwriting plus financial advice. In doing so, they com-
pete with diversified securities firms, which offer the same pack-
age of services, and with a variety of "boutique" firms that offer
specialized products such as merger and acquisition advice. In
contrast, in most other countries, there are simply fewer finan-
cial services firms with the ability to meet the needs of large or
medium-sized companies. Either a few huge banks dominate the
wholesale market, as in Germany, or banks have enjoyed a cap-
tive customer base, as in the Japanese keiretsu.1 26
124. CHERNOW, supra note 53, at 223-24.
125. In the case of Union Guardian Trust, Ford's refusal to help may have been
motivated in part by his dislike of government assistance programs such as the RFC. See
SCHLESINGER, supra note 120, at 475. Nevertheless, had Ford truly believed that his busi-
ness fortunes depended on the survival of the Michigan banking system, he might have
been forced to sacrifice principle to expediency.
126. For further discussion of banking oligopolies in Germany and Japan and their
contribution to banking stability, see infra text accompanying notes 133-43.
As previously noted, Morgan has successfully drawn on existing customer relation-
ships to market new financial products, including merger and acquisition advice. See
supra text accompanying notes 52-55. According to a Morgan banker, "It would be very
rare for us to go knock on the door of a [client] that Morgan does not have a relationship
with." Kelley Holland, Morgan, BT Carve a Bank-Merger Niche, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28,
1992, at 1, 8. Nevertheless, the market for merger and acquisition advice is so competi-
tive that even Morgan is unlikely to dominate (in 1992, Morgan ranked 11th in market
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Second, the tie that traditionally has bound the corporate
client to its bank - the lending relationship - is no longer so
important in United States financial markets. When loans ac-
count for most of the corporate sector's intermediate or long-
term financing, universal banks can build on lending relation-
ships to introduce customers to other products. Symbiotic mul-
tiservice relationships can be formed. In the United States, the
largest industrial firms have been able to replace bank loans
with commercial paper or medium-term note programs. As long
as the issuer can roll over its paper at maturity, these short-term
obligations can become a long-term funding source.
Moreover, many frequent issuers have even been able to
place their paper without the assistance of a securities dealer. 127
Firms that can raise funds directly from investors do not need a
stable long-term relationship with a financial intermediary.
United States universal banks may become niche players, assist-
ing companies with occasional esoteric financing problems rather
than with their ongoing funding needs. In contrast, even huge
German corporations like Siemens and Hoechst remain impor-
tant banking customers. 2 s
What explains this difference between United States and
German capital markets? One answer may be the relative appe-
tites of German and United States firms for outside capital. Ac-
cording to Professor Richard Buxbaum, German firms have re-
mained smaller and less conglomerate than their United States
counterparts and therefore fit more readily into bank-dominated
capital markets. 29 In contrast, the appetites of many United
States firms for capital have outgrown the banking system. A
significant factor contributing to the rapid growth of the United
States commercial paper market in the 1960s and 1970s was the
inability of banks to meet the capital demands of expanding
share). Cross-marketing provides a competitive edge, but it is not the only way to suc-
ceed. Bankers Trust (ranked 26th) has followed another approach, advertising its exper-
tise in complex restructurings and other esoteric transactions. Id. at 8.
127. Between December 31, 1974 and April 30, 1982, the amount of commercial pa-
per placed directly with investors increased approximately 150%. Evelyn M. Hurley, The
Commercial Paper Market Since the Mid-Seventies, 68 FED. RESERVE BULL. 327 (1982).
See also Julian Lewis, Cutting Out the Middle Man, EURoMoNEY, Feb. 1990, at 62
(describing expansion of direct dealing between securities issuers and investors).
128. Kfibler, supra note 9, at 109. For example, the largest corporations rely on sta-
ble banking relationships for continuing export financing. Ktibler, supra note 9, at 109.
129. Buxbaum, supra note 87, at 35-36.
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companies.130 Likewise, during the past decade, multinational
Japanese corporations have outgrown the stable financing rela-
tionships provided by the keiretsu and have been forced to seek
funds in the international securities markets. 131
Of course, not all business firms can raise funds directly
from the securities markets, as recent complaints about a "credit
crunch" in both the United States 32 and Japan' 3 demonstrate.
Small businesses in particular may still benefit from stable
banking relationships. Yet these businesses are also too small to
provide effective monitoring and financial support for banks. In
Germany, where banks still dominate the capital markets, the
largest corporations efficiently perform these functions. In the
United States, the largest corporations have few incentives to do
so, since their access to capital no longer depends on the survival
of the banking industry. This suggests that allowing- United
States banks to offer more financial services will give corporate
firms more choices, but will not create the interdependencies
that may be a source of financial support for German universal
banks.
Finally, the apparent stability of universal banks is not fully
explained by symbiotic bank-client relationships. Even in Ger-
many, there have been occasional bank failures, notably
Bankhaus I.D. Herstaat in 1974."3 This suggests that stable
bank-client relationships do not offer complete protection from
financial stress.
Moreover, as financial markets become truly global, banker
domination of the capital formation process is likely to be chal-
lenged even in universal banking systems. In Japan, banks have
already lost a large portion of their traditional corporate lending
base. 135 Even German banks will be forced to compete in in-
creasingly integrated European markets.13 As capital moves
more freely through the European Community,137 the stable
130. Evelyn M. Hurley, The CommercialPaper Market, 63 FED. RESERVE BULL. 525,
532 (1977).
131. See Mitsubeautiful, supra note 90, at 87.
132. E.g., Barbara A. Rehm, Senators Turn Up the Heat Over Pullback in Lending,
Am. BANKER, Aug. 6, 1992, at 1.
133. See supra note 96.
134. See GAO Study, supra note 2, at 33.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 88-96.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
137. Many financial observers believe that this particular goal of European unity
has already been achieved as a practical matter, despite political developments that may
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lending relationships enjoyed by German banks may suffer the
same erosion that occurred in the United States in the 1970s
and in Japan in the 1980s. For German banks, this may mean
lower profits and perhaps even a diminished role in the financial
sector.138
Despite these new challenges, however, no one expects the
German or Japanese banking systems to experience the high
failure rates and dislocation that have affected American banks.
There must be other reasons why non-United States banking
systems are more stable than our own. As will be shown, these
reasons have little to do with the universal banking model.
III. UNIVERSAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL OLIGOPOLY
One explanation of the apparent stability of many non-
United States banking systems is their predominantly oligopolis-
tic banking structure. The United States has approximately
12,800 commercial banks.'39 Germany has 4,400 banks, but 1,200
of these are very small, with a business volume of less than 28.4
million dollars as of 1989.140 The Big Three banks dominate, ac-
counting for most securities underwriting,"' trade finance and
letters of credit.142 Both Japan and France have fewer than 500
banks.143
Thus, one factor contributing to the high rate of bank fail-
ure in the United States may be overcapacity. Until recently,
United States banks enjoyed regulatory subsidies (such as inex-
pensive deposit insurance and interest rate ceilings on deposits)
and protected product and geographic markets. Many of these
subsidies reflected deliberate government policy to protect a
banking system consisting of large numbers of independent local
banks. 44 Recently, deregulation and competitive pressures have
ended the industry's ability to sustain a full service bank on
every corner. As the industry adjusts, bank failure rates inevita-
bly will be high.
be slowing formal legal and economic integration. See Loehnis, supra note 51, at 1A.
138. See Kraus, supra note 49, at 8A.
139. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 32 n.5.
140. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 32.
141. Kallfass, supra note 38, at 780.
142. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 14.
143. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 32.
144. This apparently was a goal of federal deposit insurance. See Carter H.
Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933, 76 POL. ScL Q. 181 (1960).
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Nevertheless, even when overcapacity is not a factor, con-
centrated banking systems may be inherently more stable than
fragmented systems. One reason may be that oligopoly facili-
tates regulatory oversight. 145 Bank examiners have fewer banks
to monitor. To the extent that market discipline can be relied
upon as an adjunct to government supervision, professional se-
curities analysts and investors are more likely to follow a hand-
ful of large banks than thousands of smaller banks.Of course, as bank size and complexity grow, monitoring be-
comes more difficult. Moreover, the consequences of monitoring
failure are more severe, affecting large numbers of customers
and investors. On the other hand, as the number of banks de-
creases, their visibility increases. This may make bank managers
susceptible to pressure from regulators, the press and investors
to operate their banks responsibly.
Perhaps most important, oligopoly may encourage collective
action by banks to solve their own problems. The smaller the
number of players in the banking system, the more likely it be-
comes that interbank exposures and other business ties will give
each bank a sufficient stake in the others' survival to justify col-
lective action to avert failure. Further, the failure of a major
player in a concentrated banking market can easily shake public
confidence in the entire banking systemi, directly affecting the
survivors. Finally, coordinated actibn is easier when participants
are few. Free riders can be identified and disciplined.
In Germany, banks have acted collectively to help ailing
banks resolve their problems. For example, in 1983, the banking
industry participated in a joint effort to rescue Schroder,
Munchmeyer, Hengst & Co., which had banking operations in
Germany and Luxembourg. 146 Rescue operations usually have
taken place through the private Federal Association of German
Banks, which also administers the deposit insurance system.1 7
The Association puts pressure on member banks to provide fi-
nancial assistance to a troubled bank and coordinates rescue ef-
forts with the bank regulators." 8 German regulators believe that
their banks' stake in preserving international confidence in the
banking system provides a strong motive for voluntary collective
145. Central bankers in Europe and Japan believe that this is the case. See GAO
Study, supra note 2, at 31.
146. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 34.
147. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 34.
148. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 15.
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action to avert a major failure even if participating banks suffer
short-term losses.149
In the United States, joint action is more costly and offers
fewer benefits for individual banks. Although healthy banks are
often asked to maintain existing credit lines to ailing banks until
the government can arrange a permanent solution, industry-wide
rescues, particularly those involving private capital injections,
have been rare. In the 1930s, President Hoover tried to persuade
healthy banks to act jointly to provide a credit reserve for banks
experiencing financial difficulties, but efforts to rely on volunta-
rism failed. Most bankers insisted that financial support was the
government's responsibility. Shortly thereafter, a government
agency was set up to perform this function.150
Since the 1930s, the government has continued to bear most
of the burden of recapitalizing or liquidating failing banks.' 5'
Healthy banks have occasionally been persuaded to participate,
but only in special circumstances' 52 - and when the govern-
ment has committed to bear most of the risk. 53 Even when a
149. GAO Study, supra-note 2, at 34.
150. The agency was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. See SCHLESINGER,
supra note 120, at 236.
151. To the extent that the government pays for failure resolution. out of the deposit
insurance fund, all banks that are required to pay insurance premiums ultimately share
the financial burden. Nevertheless, when failure resolution costs have been high, healthy
banks have not been willing to contribute additional amounts to assist troubled banks or
the insurance fund. In the 1930s, for example, funds for recapitalizing the banking indus-
try came from the government-sponsored Reconstruction Finance Corporation, not from
the deposit insurance fund. See JONES, supra note 119, at 13-53. Moreover, healthy
banks have rarely been willing to act collectively to avert failure by providing either
financial support or managerial guidance to ailing banks before government intervention
is needed. Today, as in the 1930s, bank rescues remain the responsibility of government.
Private participation extends only to paying mandatory deposit insurance premiums. In
contrast, in Germany, the private banking sector has taken the lead in arranging and
funding bank rescues, making government intervention (or resort to formal deposit in-
surance assessments) unnecessary in most cases.
The negative attitude of most U.S. banks toward voluntary collective action to avert
failure is suggested by the industry's generally positive response to the introduction of
risk-based deposit insurance premiums. See infra text accompanying note 155. Now the
healthiest banks can expect to bear even less of the financial responsibility for assisting
the weakest players. In Germany, the expectations of the strongest banks are exactly the
opposite.
152. For example, in 1971, Boston banks participated in the bailout of the minority-
owned Unity Bank. Even in this case, however, the banks insisted on a substantial injec-
tion of public capital. Moreover, although the banks agreed to provide ongoing manage-
ment training, it proved unsuccessful. Unity failed again, requiring another government
rescue. See IRvmm H. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT: AN INSIDER's AccouNT OF BANK FAILURES AND
REscUEs 35-52 (1986).
153. For example, in the rescue of First Pennsylvania, which is usually cited as an
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healthy bank agrees to take over a failing bank's franchise, the
government routinely provides attractive financial incentives, in-
cluding protection against future losses.""
This suggests that United States banks do not have ade-
quate financial incentives to participate in German-style private
rescues of ailing banks. (In fact, healthy banks have long com-
plained that their deposit insurance premiums are already too
high, subsidizing weaker institutions. 155) There are simply too
many banks, and too many banks that need rescuing. Moreover,
recent United States bank regulatory policy has actually tried to
discourage interbank exposures and other financial interconnec-
tions among banks that could provide a motive for mutual
assistance. 156
Although oligopoly may enhance the stability of a banking
system, oligopolistic banking systems are not necessarily univer-
sal banking systems. British banking traditionally has been
dominated by a handful of players, but until recently the large
clearing banks did not exercise the powers of universal banks. 57
Conversely, in the United States, permitting banks to enjoy
universal banking powers will not necessarily lead to greater in-
dustry concentration. Although critics occasionally have warned
of the coming of the financial behemoths (such as a combined
Citicorp-Merrill Lynch), there are already so many independent
players in every corner of the United States financial services
markets, including both diversified and specialized firms, that
we are unlikely to match the degree of financial concentration
that is seen in Germany. Although no one expects 12,000 inde-
pendent banks to survive into the next century, industry
shrinkage is likely to proceed slowly, through intra-industry
mergers and failures, rather than through the fashioning of a
handful of giant banking-industrial combines. 15 8
example of successful collective action by the banking industry, private banks partici-
pated reluctantly, providing loans of just $175 million to the FDIC's $325 million. Id. at
92-95.
154. See John F. Bovenzi & Arthur J. Murton, Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1
FDIC BANKING REV. 1 (1988).
155. Recently mandated risk-based deposit insurance premiums may address this
concern. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2245, § 302 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1988)).
156. E.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, § 308
(adding new § 23 to the Federal Reserve Act) (requiring Federal Reserve to limit in-
terbank deposits and other interbank exposures).
157. See supra note 3.
158. Based on the experience of the thrift industry when barriers to affiliation with
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One caveat must be noted. Although oligopolistic banking
structures may facilitate collective action to avert failure of indi-
vidual banks, they are vulnerable to system-wide financial dis-
tress. Financial interconnections among banks may be so exten-
sive that the collapse of one institution leaves other players too
weak to participate in a coordinated rescue effort. This suggests
the significance of early intervention to resolve banking
problems before they become contagious. As the next section
will describe, such early intervention is characteristic of stable
banking systems.
IV. UNIVERSAL BANKING AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
Another explanation of the low failure rates in many non-
United States banking systems is the role of government action.
Bank regulators around the world typically deny that they fol-
low a "too big to fail" policy.159 Technically, this is accurate,
since few banks are allowed to deteriorate to the point where
failure is imminent. Instead, direct and indirect government ac-
tion ensures prompt correction of banking problems.
In many cases, government action simply means creating in-
centives for private self-help. In Japan, for example, the Minis-
try of Finance (MOF) traditionally has encouraged a policy of
"mutual aid" whereby the large city banks have rescued smaller
banks that have experienced financial difficulty. Although these
city banks do not have an obvious financial stake in the survival
of local institutions, the MOF has encouraged cooperation
through its jealously guarded control over the granting of branch
licenses. If city banks want permission to expand their opera-
tions, they must comply with regulatory requests for voluntary
mutual assistance 60
Recently, the financial problems experienced by many city
banks in Japan have made mutual aid more difficult to enforce.
Nevertheless, observers of the Japanese banking system (includ-
ing, significantly for Japanese banks seeking capital from inter-
national securities markets, the rating agencies) doubt that
United States-style bank failures will occur.1 '- This does not
commercial firms were lifted, analysts have predicted that allowing commercial-banking
affiliations is unlikely to result in massive cross-industry acquisitions. See Debra Cope,
Outside Capital May Be Hard to Come By, Am. BANKER, Oct. 17, 1991, at 1.
159. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 33.
160. Sender, supra note 43, at 130.
161. See Japanese Banks Seen Facing Tough Decade, supra note 96, at 12.
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necessarily mean that the Japanese government will recapitalize
the banking industry either by direct financial assistance or by
regulatory subsidy (such as reimposing interest rate ceilings on
deposits).162 There are indications that the government's long-
term policy will be to encourage banks to shrink, cutting back
their extensive international operations. 163 Nevertheless, govern-
ment involvement will ensure that industry restructuring takes
place, and that it takes place peacefully through merger or di-
vestiture rather than through failure."'
Other banking systems also contemplate a major govern-
ment role in averting bank failure, usually by engineering pri-
vate recapitalizations of weak banks. In France, the central bank
may call upon the major shareholders of a troubled bank to re-
build its capital base, a procedure used in 1988 to rescue Al
Saudi Banque, S.A.16 5 Of course, assessability schemes are not
always successful."6 In the case of Al Saudi, many of the bank's
foreign shareholders refused to cooperate. The French central
bank then called upon the French financial community, includ-
ing both banks and money market funds that held deposits in Al
Saudi Banque, to supply the needed funds.16 7
How do these approaches differ from the United States ap-
162. See supra text accompanying note 91. But see supra note 96 (suggesting rea-
sons why the Japanese government may be forced to support the banks, at least in the
short term).
163. See supra text accompanying note 96. See also James R. Kraus, Foreign
Banks' Growth in U.S. Comes to Halt, AM. BANKER, Oct. 14, 1992, at 1 (6% decline in
U.S. assets held by Japanese banks during first half of 1992 reflects a conscious decision
to pull back from U.S. markets).
164. The restructuring plan announced in October 1992 suggests that, notwithstand-
ing its pledge not to use public monies to recapitalize the banking industry, the Japanese
government will remain actively involved in resolving bank problems. The plan contem-
plates a combination of private collective action (the banks will finance a new corpora-
tion to buy troubled loans) and government assistance in the form of tax breaks. See
supra note 96. Nevertheless, many analysts believe that this plan is inadequate and that
the government is underestimating the extent of the banking crisis. Sterngold, supra
note 96, at 37. If, as most observers still believe, the Japanese government remains com-
mitted to preserving the stability of its banking system, it may be forced to take addi-
tional steps to rescue the industry.
165. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 35.
166. One problem is that diversified shareholders do not always have a sufficient
financial stake in their bank's survival to contribute voluntarily. See supra text accom-
panying note 112. Legal action against dispersed and, in the Al Saudi case, foreign share-
holders is costly or impossible. In any case, most non-U.S. central banks apparently pre-
fer to resolve bank problems through cooperative efforts rather than through formal legal
proceedings. See infra note 173.
167. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 35.
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proach? First, United States bank regulators traditionally have
had limited legal or moral authority to compel private players,
whether shareholders, depositors or other banks, to recapitalize
troubled institutions. Over the past few years, Congress has in-
creased the bank regulators' authority to seek contribution at
least from affiliated corporate entities. When a bank fails, the
deposit insurance fund may now seek reimbursement for its fail-
ure resolution costs from "commonly controlled depository insti-
tutions." ' Bank holding companies may be called upon to guar-
antee the recapitalization of an undercapitalized bank subsidiary
in an amount up to five percent of the undercapitalized bank's
assets.16 9
The efficacy of these provisions, however, depends on the
capacity of affiliated entities to contribute resources to their ail-
ing banks and their willingness to do so without a protracted
legal battle. Experience suggests that affiliated entities may
prove to be an unreliable source of financial support for ailing
banks. If, as is likely, the financial burden is substantial, affili-
ated companies may not have sufficient assets to meet their obli-
gation. The result of enforcing contribution will be the failure of
the entire organization, which may facilitate its sale as a package
but which will hardly avert bank failure.
Moreover, if the bank is already so weak that failure is inev-
itable, affiliated entities have no incentive to cooperate, forcing
the government to commence costly legal proceedings. 171 In con-
trast, as suggested by the French experience, nonaffiliated par-
ties with a substantial financial stake in the bank's survival may
actually be more willing (and able) to share the burdens and
benefits of recapitalization.
Second, in the United States, failure prevention policy
tends to come into play only after a bank is in dire financial
straits. As previously noted, most central bankers outside of the
United States deny that they follow the much maligned "too big
to fail" policy. 1 In the United States, that policy has meant in
168. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
§ 206(e), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1988 & Supp. 11 (1990)).
169. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, § 131 (ad-
ding new § 38 to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
170. Cf. MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991) (protracted
litigation by Federal Reserve to enforce its "source of strength doctrine" requiring bank
holding companies to provide financial support to affiliated banks).
171. See supra text accompanying note 159.
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effect that when a large bank like Continental Illinois is on the
verge of insolvency, the regulators are likely to provide open
bank assistance or arrange a merger with a healthy bank in or-
der to avoid the cost of closing the bank and paying off insured
depositors out of the insurance fund. (Recently, Congress has
tried to scuttle the "too big to fail" policy by requiring the regu-
lators to prove that these alternatives to liquidation are less
costly to the deposit insurance fund in the long run.17 2)
Thus, in the United States, the "too big to fail" policy is an
approach to failure resolution, not failure prevention. It is in-
voked only after a bank has experienced such severe financial
problems that, without government help, failure is certain. In
contrast, other central banks appear to have more flexibility to
intervene to prevent potential risks to the banking system that
may not yet be sufficiently tangible to allow quantification.173
Moreover, the central bank's role in these Cases is to en-
courage collective action by the banking industry to assist troub-
led institutions, not to expend deposit insurance funds. Deposit
insurance comes into play only if the decision is made by the
central bank to let a bank fail. 1 7 Thus, fewer banks actually fail.
When they do, in most cases, failure reflects deliberate central
bank policy.
172. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, § 141
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1988)). Critics of "too big to fail" made three arguments:
that open bank assistance and mergers protected uninsured as well as insured depositors;
that, as a result, small banks were at a competitive disadvantage in attracting funds; and
that liquidation was actually a less costly solution in most cases.
173. See GAO Study, supra note 2, at 33-39 (describing central bank policies in
Europe, Japan and Canada). Recently, Congress has endorsed a policy of early regulatory
intervention in undercapitalized banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991, § 131 (adding new § 38 to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
This approach differs from the European approach in two respects. First, Congress has
legislated specific actions that bank regulators must take against undercapitalized banks,
such as restricting asset growth and the payment of above-market interest rates on de-
posits. Most central banks prefer flexible case-by-case solutions. See, e.g., GAO Study,
supra note 2, at 16 (French regulatory policy). Second, early intervention turns on un-
dercapitalization. Undercapitalized banks are expected to attract new capital on their
own or face regulatory penalties. In contrast, most central banks encourage some form of
mutual aid whereby healthy banks or other market participants are responsible for re-
capitalizing weak banks.
174. If the central bank has decided to rescue a bank but new private capital cannot
be raised from industry participants, can the central bank (or government) use public
funds to recapitalize the bank? The answer appears to be yes. In France, for example,
the central bank may take "appropriate measures to rescue the bank" if appeals for new
private capital have been unsuccessful - or it can let the bank fail and invoke deposit
insurance. See GAO Study, supra note 2, at 16.
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Is an active government failure prevention policy a neces-
sary component of the universal banking model? There may be
some connection. The large universal banks of Germany, for ex-
ample, dominate the capital markets. The failure of any one
would cause substantial market disruption, providing a motive
for government policy to prevent bank failure. Nevertheless, the
strategic significance of these banks to the German economy is
also the result of Germany's oligopolistic banking structure.
Moreover, in Germany and Japan, failure prevention policies
have applied equally to giant wholesale banks and small local
institutions.' 15 In both nations, the central bank is primarily
concerned with maintaining confidence in the banking system,
which may involve preventing most, if not all, bank failure.'76
Why does maintaining public confidence in banks seem to
be of greater concern in Germany and Japan than in the United
States? In Germany, it may reflect the importance of bank lend-
ing relationships to the industrial sector. In Japan, cultural dif-
ferences and attitudes toward business failure may also play a
role.177
These factors have little to do with the actual mix of powers
available to banks. This suggests that expanding United States
bank powers will not necessarily expand the government's role
in failure prevention. The United States financial markets have
tolerated the failure of diversified securities organizations such
as Drexel Burnham.7 5 In the past, they have tolerated bailouts
175. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49 (Germany) & 160 (Japan).
176. One difference between the German and Japanese banking systems should be
noted. In Japan, central bank policy reflects government policy. The Bank of Japan acts
as an administrative extension of the MOF. GAO Study, supra note 2, at 27. In Ger-
many, the Bundesbank is (at least theoretically) independent from political forces. Nev-
ertheless, banking stability has been a priority in Germany for both the central bank and
the government. Both the Bundesbank and the government's Federal Banking Supervi-
sory Office are involved in bank oversight and coordinated rescue efforts. GAO Study,
supra note 2, at 15.
177. Active bank support policies are favored by most European governments, for
one or both of the reasons identified here. As this paper was being written, the govern-
ment of Sweden was contemplating some form of public recapitalization or financial sup-
port for its troubled banking industry. Swedish Ministry of Finance, Statement by the
Minister for Fiscal and Financial Affairs (Sept. 24, 1992) (on file with the Brooklyn Jour-
nal of International Law). The Swedish example provides further support for two points
made in this paper. First, universal banking powers do not entirely insulate, banks from
financial distress. Second, in most non-U.S. banking systems, preserving international
confidence in the banking system is a matter of national economic policy, providing the
justification for failure prevention.
178. In Drexel's case, government regulators did act to ensure that the firm's liqui-
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of banks mainly to protect the deposit insurance fund from even
greater losses. Most admirers of universal banking systems have
no desire to emulate the activist failure prevention policies of
nations like Germany and Japan."
V. CONCLUSION
Most of our economic rivals have universal banking systems.
Most of these systems have experienced fewer bank failures than
ours. Does this mean that the universal banking model is inher-
ently more stable than our own?
At a time when quick fixes to banking problems are in de-
mand, it is tempting to say yes and to advocate bank diversifica-
tion as the solution to the banking crisis. The story, as usual, is
more complex. The apparent stability of universal banking sys-
tems is more closely tied to local capital market structures and
government policies than to the mix of financial products availa-
ble from banks. Simply giving United States banks more powers
will not produce an American version of the German "Gross-
banken." It may merely lead to a shift in the relative fortunes of
dation occurred in an orderly fashion so as to minimize customer losses. Nevertheless,
the government did not deem it necessary to keep Drexel alive as a going concern despite
the probable adverse effect of its demise on the junk bond market that Drexel had virtu-
ally created and still dominated. See Wall St. Era Ends as Drexel Burnham Decides to
Liquidate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at Al. In fact, Drexel's failure did shake public
confidence in the junk bond market, causing serious dislocations for companies and in-
vestors that had relied on the continued stability of this market. But there was no signif-
icant spillover effect on other funding markets in which Drexel was not a major player.
Competitive, fragmented financial markets meant that the financial system as a whole
could survive the loss of even a large financial intermediary.
179. Although fragmented financial markets may give us the luxury of being able to
tolerate the failure of even a large financial intermediary, there is one cost worth consid-
ering. Government support policies affect debt ratings, and debt ratings affect banks'
ability to compete for capital. Recently, U.S. money market funds have not been able to
invest in some U.S. banks because these banks' credit ratings are too low to meet the
minimum legal investment standards mandated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission that limit money market funds to high quality debt securities. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.2a-7 (1992). Because of government support policies, non-U.S. banks may be able
to hold onto their high ratings and enjoy a funding advantage in the U.S. money mar-
kets. (For example, the perception that the Japanese government will never let a major
bank fall may put a floor under the ratings slide that has been experienced by Japanese
banks as their financial condition has deteriorated. See supra text accompanying note
161.) This is not a problem for those U.S. banks that have been able to signal their credit
quality to the international markets, but it does affect weaker banks, raising questions as
to whether they can raise enough new capital to take advantage of universal banking
powers. This may be another reason why universal banking powers are not likely to solve
the profitability problems currently experienced by so many U.S. banks.
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the present players in our highly competitive, fragmented finan-
cial markets.
There may be good reasons to permit banks to diversify.
One reason is that market realignment has already occurred.
Morgan and Bankers Trust are already closer to investment
banks than to old-fashioned full-service commercial banks.
There may be different reasons to emulate the banking poli-
cies of Europe and Japan which in the past have deliberately
encouraged stability over competition in financial markets.
Before we wish for the harmony of other banking systems, how-
ever, it is worth noting that many universal bankers envy the
vibrancy of our own capital markets. In fact, the trend in univer-
sal banking markets seems to be toward increased competition
and the breakup of traditional oligopolies, as suggested by devel-
opments in Japan and in the integrated European market.
Ironically, in global markets, a new version of the universal
bank may be prevailing - the highly competitive capital market
specialist that more closely resembles the United States hybrid
than the traditional universal banks of Europe. This universal
bank may not enjoy the stable earnings and capital market insu-
lation of its predecessor, which benefited from underdeveloped
securities markets and a bank-dominated credit system. Never-
theless, this new universal bank is better positioned to compete
in rapidly changing financial markets, offering a package of so-
phisticated products that satisfy growing customer demand for
better financial services. As we look to Europe for a model of
expanded bank powers, European banks may be looking to our
successful universal banks for examples of how to carve a niche
in fiercely competitive international financial markets.
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